The Future of Musical Emotions by van der Schyff, D. & Schiavio, A.
OPINION
published: 19 June 2017
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00988
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 June 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 988
Edited by:
Fausto Caruana,
University of Parma, Italy
Reviewed by:
Marco Viola,
Istituto Universitario di Studi Superiori
di Pavia (IUSS), Italy
Joel Krueger,
University of Exeter, United Kingdom
*Correspondence:





This article was submitted to
Theoretical and Philosophical
Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 03 May 2017
Accepted: 29 May 2017
Published: 19 June 2017
Citation:
van der Schyff D and Schiavio A
(2017) The Future of Musical
Emotions. Front. Psychol. 8:988.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00988
The Future of Musical Emotions
Dylan van der Schyff 1* and Andrea Schiavio 2, 3*
1 Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 2 Institute for Music Education, University of Music
and Performing Arts Graz, Graz, Austria, 3Music Mind Machine in Sheffield, Department of Music, The University of Sheffield,
Sheffield, United Kingdom
Keywords: musical emotions, basic emotions, affective science, dynamical systems theory, music cognition
INTRODUCTION
Basic Emotion Theory proper (BET) has only recently begun to make an appearance in musical
research (see Juslin, 1997, 2013a,b). However, much theory and research in music psychology has
been driven by a more general assumption that musical emotions should be investigated in terms of
discrete ad-hoc1 categories associated with the ways specific neural mechanisms respond to musical
stimuli (see Schiavio et al., 2016). This has been problematized, however, by studies that show
that the physiological changes associated with musical emotions do not always align clearly with
those exhibited in association with everyday emotion categories (Krumhansl, 1997, p. 351; Scherer
and Zentner, 2001). Such concerns have led some scholars to posit that musical emotions may
be somehow different (or perhaps “impoverished”) versions of real emotions (Sloboda, 2000). In
response to this, other researchers (e.g., Scherer and Coutinho, 2014) have developed models that
do away with the notion of basic emotions altogether, preferring instead to describe emotional
reactions to music in terms of complex information processing components that combine in
various ways to produce relevant outputs (see also Huron, 2006). Still others (Krueger, 2013;
van der Schyff, 2013; Schiavio et al., 2016; see also Koelsch, 2013) have suggested that reducing
musical experience to a stimulus-response framework—where emotions are thought to be caused
in listeners by pre-given stimuli in the environment—may play down the active and creative role
living embodied agents play in musical experience.
With this in mind, we offer below a brief critique of BET, suggesting that it may not in fact
provide the best way forward for research in musical emotions. We then outline an alternative
perspective, drawing on research that employs dynamical systems theory (DST) (Lewis and Granic,
2000; Colombetti, 2014). To conclude, we offer some preliminary suggestions for how this approach
might be applied in musical contexts.
Before we begin, it should be noted that musical research that draws on the idea of basic
emotions has indeed produced important insights2. Such studies are carried out in controlled
settings that adhere to high scientific research standards—they offer important sources of data that
will have to be taken into consideration by any alternative theoretical orientation. To be clear, then,
our aim is not to debunk or discredit the work of researchers endorsing BET. Rather, our goal is
simply to outline another perspective that could make important contributions to the dialogue3.
1Indeed, these categories tend to vary from study to study. Some have focused on more “basic” emotions (e.g., joy and
sadness), while others introduce categories that might be better described as “moods” (e.g., tenderness or nostalgia). Recent
approaches have developed more nuanced models that introduce complex “aesthetic” categories such as wonder and awe. For
useful overviews see Juslin and Laukka (2004), Juslin and Västfjäll (2008), Eerola and Vuoskoski (2013), Trost et al. (2013).
2This includes the work of Juslin (1997, 2013a,b) who argues that BET proper should be adopted more widely in musical
emotion studies. In line with this, recent research has explored (among other things) the relationship between perceived
emotions and physiological changes (Lundqvist et al., 2008), as well as how emotional categories may be recognized
consistently across listeners (Fritz et al., 2009).
3Indeed, comparisons of research results between competing programs may lead to important new discoveries and avenues
of investigation.
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BASIC EMOTIONS
In folk psychology, the notion of “basic emotions” involves
the assumption that emotions come in a group of pre-defined
categories such as happy, sad, angry, and so on. This idea has been
formalized by BET proper, which claims the existence of a small
group of “discrete” basic emotions that evolved in response to
the challenges our ancestors faced in their everyday life (Ekman,
1980). It is argued that each basic emotion is defined by a
dedicated (innate and distinct) neural network, which controls
the “affect programs” that give rise to them (Tomkins, 1962,
1963; see also Colombetti, 2014). Here the term “affect programs”
refers to the mechanisms that produce “the patterns for these
complex organized responses, and which when set off directs
their occurrence” (Ekman, 1980 p., 82). Such programs and the
responses they trigger (i.e., basic emotions) are thought to be
culturally universal and are thus understood to function as “auto
appraisals” selected by evolution (Ekman and Friesen, 1971, 1986;
Ekman, 1999, 2003). It has also been suggested that because of the
supposed categorical fixity of these basic emotions, they might
form the “building blocks” from which more complex emotions
emerge (Prinz, 2004a,b).
Some critics have raised the question of how, precisely,
alleged basic emotions relate to non-basic ones (Ortony and
Turner, 1990). And there is an ongoing debate between those
who argue that basic and non-basic emotions are continuous
(Plutchik, 2001; Prinz, 2004a,b; Clark, 2010), and those who
insist that the two involve distinct processes and should thus
be studied separately (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996). Other
authors question BET’s lack of context sensitivity (Russell, 2003;
Barrett, 2006): emotions can be expressed and experienced in
various ways and theirmeanings shift depending on the situation.
Attention has also been drawn to the BET methodology, which
often employs a forced choice approach (generally between facial
expressions and a given scenario). Indeed, research has shown
that quite different responses may be given when participants are
not constrained by emotional labeling (Russell, 1994). It has also
been pointed out that the close correlations that are expected to
occur between specific brain areas, autonomic nervous system
activity, and the putative affect programs associated with basic
emotions are often less consistent than hypothesized (Barrett,
2006). While advocates of BET have responded to such criticisms
in various ways (e.g., Ekman and Cordaro, 2011), another
more general problem remains concerning the rather arbitrary
way basic emotion categories were originally introduced4. To
be clear, all of this does not negate the observation that
emotional episodes involve recurring psycho-physical patterns of
behavior that are indeed nameable, and that may bear striking
similarities across individuals and groups. Rather, it suggests
that we need to develop new approaches for studying such
phenomena.
4This refers to the work of Tomkins (1962, 1963), who posited the existence of
nine primary affect categories (1962, p. 111–112). While no sustained justification
was given by Tomkins for why these categories were chosen, subsets of them have
nevertheless been assumed to comprise the basic emotional responses that guide
our affective engagements with the world. For a full discussion see Colombetti
(2014), p. 36–40.
EMOTIONS AS DYNAMIC AND EMERGENT
Research based on DST suggests that emotional episodes may
not be reducible to pre-given response mechanisms in the brain,
but rather emerge through developmental processes spanning
an integrated body-brain-environment network (Freeman, 2000;
Lewis, 2000, 2005). Colombetti (2014, p. 57–82) suggests
three mutually informing levels of inquiry that may help us
better understand how this is so. The first of these involves
the development of the muscular linkages and coordinative
structures associated with emotional expression (e.g., facial,
vocal, limb, and hand movement). And indeed, research shows
that the appearance of recurrent and meaningful patterns of
expressive behavior in infants is not best understood wholly in
terms of predetermined (i.e., genetic) developmental programs,
but rather as emergent properties of the dynamic interaction of
a range of environmental and bodily factors (Fogel and Thelen,
1987; Camras and Witherington, 2005). The second level draws
on existing work in affective neuroscience that highlights the
plasticity and self-organizing nature of neural structures (see
Freeman, 1999, 2000). Here, emotional episodes are explored
as patterns of convergence (basins of attraction) in the neural
trajectories of an agent that may both stabilize and transform
due to contingent shifts in the global constraints of the brain-
body-world system. The third level focusses on environmental
concerns, exploring how agents enact meaningful emotional
engagements (i.e., recurrent patterns of relational behavior) with
the things and people they interact with, and the situations they
live through (Laible and Thompson, 2000; Hsu and Fogel, 2003).
From this perspective, emotional episodes are not limited to the
skull or the skin of the organism. There is, rather, a strong sense
in which they “extend” (Krueger, 2014; Slaby, 2014; Krueger
and Szanto, 2016) into environments where agents co-enact
meaningful worlds through forms of participatory sense-making
(such as music; see Schiavio and De Jaegher, 2017).
In brief, the DST approach explores the active and self-
organizing nature of emotional experience as it develops across
bodily, neural, and ecological dimensions, suggesting that while
emotional episodes can indeed be unique to an individual
organism, they may also emerge in ways that are shared between
agents with similar biological/social needs and histories of
interaction with the environment.
EXPLORING THE DYNAMICS OF MUSICAL
EMOTIONS
It should be noted that work in music cognition has already
begun to develop DST approaches. For example, researchers
(e.g., Large and Jones, 1999) have investigated how the neural
dynamics associated with musical experience actively resonate
and self-organize with those of the body and the environment in
a recursive or “circular” way. However, such “dynamic attending”
to music has been explored mostly in the context of rhythmic
entrainment and pitch perception (e.g., Large et al., 2016; see also
McGrath and Kelly, 1986). We suggest that future research could
develop the emotional implications of this more fully. Indeed,
this would contribute to a larger body of inter-disciplinary
work that explores the creative, social, embodied, ecological,
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and developmental aspects of musical experience (DeNora, 2000;
Leman, 2007; van der Schyff, 2015).
For example, it has been shown that even in contexts
that appear to be “passive” (e.g., listening in a concert hall)
people play active roles in shaping their engagements with
musical environments5 (Clarke, 2005; Krueger, 2014)—e.g.,
by developing “metaphorical,” cross-modal, and “narrative”
relationships between various temporal, spatial, textural, bodily,
social, ecological, and affective dimensions (see Johnson, 2007).
Here, DST could be useful for exploring how such experiences
are enacted, especially when integrated with phenomenological
descriptions6.
This orientation could also be developed in contexts involving
the production of music (performance, rehearsal, instrumental
practice, and so on). Indeed, because musical performance
clearly involves the integration of the three levels of description
discussed above (bodily/neural/environmental), DST might be
used to investigate and describe situations where two or more
individuals participate in realizing the same musical event. This
could include the use of electrophysiological measurements in
association with techniques such as functional near-infrared
spectroscopy (fNIRS), which are increasingly adopted in the
context of social cognition (Osaka et al., 2015; Pu et al., 2016).
As fNIRS allows for the measurement of hemodynamic
activities in participatory settings it could be particularly useful
for exploring music-related activities in terms of interpersonal
emotional dynamics. These could be analyzed in conjunction
with audio and video recordings (to help capture sonic, bodily,
and other environmental aspects); as well as through interviews
with the participants to better understand how various forms of
musically adaptive behavior might initiate (and be driven by)
emotional episodes that are both recurrent and new, and how
such episodes are experienced by the participants (e.g., as shared
and/or as personal). Examples of similar data collection methods
come from work by Walton et al. (2014, 2015) who have used
DST to study perceptions of creativity in interacting musical
improvisers (see also Borgo, 2005; Laroche and Kaddouch,
2015)7.
5Here onemight also consider the ways people use personal music listening devices
to regulate their emotions (Skånland, 2013) in everyday life and to transform or
“aestheticize” the environments they live though (Bull, 2000, 2007). This could
offer yet another avenue to explore from a dynamical perspective.
6Here the recently developed “4E” model (embodied, embedded, enactive, and
extended) associated with enactive cognitive science could provide a general
framework for guiding the phenomenological aspects of such research (for a brief
overview see van der Schyff, 2017; for a range of more detailed perspectives see
Menary, 2010).
7On a related note, readers may also be interested to consider a study by Salice
et al. (2017) that examines the enmeshed embodied, social, affective, and musical
dynamics of a string quartet to explore the phenomenon of “plural self-awareness.”
In all, we suggest that a DST approach may better capture
the (inter)active ways people enact emotional relationships with
music, and how such experiences develop diachronically. That is,
it may help us better understand how musical emotions emerge
and transform developmentally in the context of people’s lives—
where stable or recurrent patterns of behavior may come to
be experienced in similar ways between embodied agents, and
thus be subject to “loose” labeling without being wholly pre-
determined, fixed, or simply reducible to discrete categories.
Likewise, it may also provide insights into the more idiosyncratic
ways we engage emotionally with music—e.g., the conscious
ways individuals seek out new approaches to music making as a
means of creative expression, or as a way of enacting meaningful
but highly personal embodied-emotional relationships (aesthetic,
social, therapeutic) with the environments they inhabit (DeNora,
2000).
CONCLUSION
While BET-based approaches will continue to provide many
useful insights in more controlled environments, we suggest
that the DST perspective may better capture the manifold ways
emotional engagement with music unfolds in the complex,
embodied, and socially interactive contexts that characterize lived
experience. Because this approach sees emotions as emergent and
enacted, and not first in terms of pre-given categories or “affect
programs,” it arguably sidesteps the problematic issue introduced
above regarding whether musical emotions correspond with
“basic,” “real,” or “everyday” emotions. In line with this, it would
be very interesting to see how the results of musical research
that assume a basic emotion approach might be reinterpreted
from a DST perspective. Additionally, DST might also shed
light on important aspects of musical development in early
childhood8. Lastly, because DST-based research sees emotionality
as inextricable from our embodied and social existence, it could
have more general implications for areas such as music education
and therapy—perhaps providing ways for teachers, students,
therapists, and patients to better understand and discuss their
engagements with music and its meaning for their lives.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
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